We generalize the classic problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods to the problem of fair public decision making, in which a decision must be made on several social issues simultaneously, and, unlike the classic se ing, a decision can provide positive utility to multiple players. We extend the popular fairness notion of proportionality (which is not guaranteeable) to our more general se ing, and introduce three novel relaxations proportionality up to one issue, round robin share, and pessimistic proportional share -that are also interesting in the classic goods allocation se ing. We show that the Maximum Nash Welfare solution, which is known to satisfy appealing fairness properties in the classic se ing, satis es or approximates all three relaxations in our framework. We also provide polynomial time algorithms and hardness results for nding allocations satisfying these axioms, with or without insisting on Pareto optimality. 1 at said, there is a recent line of work on implicit utilitarian voting that a empts to maximize an objective with respect to the cardinal utilities underlying the ordinal preferences [7, 29] , and is therefore closer to our work.
INTRODUCTION
e literature on mathematically rigorous fair division dates back to the work of Steinhaus [33] . In the eld's long history, most work focuses on the fair division of private goods, in which a set of m items must be divided among a set of n players. Agents express their preferences by specifying their value for each good, and our goal is to nd a division of the goods that is fair to all players.
One particularly appealing notion of fairness is envy-freeness [18] , which says that no player should want to switch her set of items with that of another player. is is a natural and strong notion of fairness that has long been the subject of fair division research [8, 9, 13, 21, 22, 32, 34] . It actually implies many other fairness notions such as proportionality [33] -each player should get at least a 1/n fraction of her value for the entire set of goods -and envy-freeness up to one good (EF1) [26] -no player should envy another player a er removing at most one good from the la er player's bundle. Unfortunately, envy-freeness cannot always be guaranteed, and therefore its relaxations have been focused on [11, 14, 26, 30] .
Division of private goods, however, is not the only application in which we may desire a fair outcome. O en, we may need to make decisions where every alternative gives positive utility to many players, rather than to just one player as in the case of private goods. For instance, consider a couple, Alice and Bob, deciding where to go to dinner. Alice likes Italian food the most, but does not like Indian, whereas Bob prefers Indian food but does not like Italian. When there is only a single decision to make, we are simply in a classic bargaining game where players must a empt to arrive at a mutually agreeable solution. Nash [28] proposed maximizing the product of players' utilities (the Nash welfare) as an elegant solution that uniquely satis es several appealing properties. But no ma er how we arrive at a decision -and there is a myriad of work in computational social choice [10] discussing how exactly we should do so -some tradeo must necessarily be made, and we may not be able to make everyone happy.
However, if we have several public decisions to make, maybe we can reach a compromise by making sure that all players are happy with at least some of the decisions. For example, if Alice and Bob are to follow their dinner with a movie, then maybe Bob will be willing to eat Italian food for dinner if he gets to pick his favorite movie, and maybe Alice will agree to this compromise.
Note that this se ing generalizes the classic private goods se ing, because in this special case we can view each public decision as the allocation of a single good. While envy is a compelling notion in the private goods se ing, it makes less sense for public decisions. In our example, irrespective of where Alice and Bob go for dinner, because they are eating the same food, it is not clear what it would mean for Alice to envy Bob. If she could somehow trade places with Bob, she would still be si ing at the other end of the dinner table, eating the same food, and not be any be er o .
ankfully, proportionality still has a sensible interpretation: Each player should get at least a 1/n fraction of the utility she would get if her most desired alternative was chosen for each decision. Unfortunately, as with envy-freeness, proportionality cannot always be guaranteed. erefore in this work we consider relaxations of proportionality in order to arrive at fairness notions that can be guaranteed.
Our Results
Formally, a public decision making problem consists of m issues, where each issue has several associated alternatives. Each of n players has a utility for each alternative of each issue. Making a decision on an issue amounts to choosing one of the alternatives associated with the issue, and choosing an overall outcome requires making a decision on each issue simultaneously. e utility to a player for an outcome is the sum of her utilities for the alternatives chosen for di erent issues.
is is a very simple se ing, but one in which the problem of fairness is already non-trivial. We propose relaxations of proportionality in two directions. e rst, proportionality up to one issue (Prop1), is similar in spirit to EF1, stating that a player should be able to get her proportional share if she gets to change the outcome of a single issue in her favor. e second direction is based on the guarantees provided by the round robin mechanism. is mechanism rst orders the set of players, and then repeatedly goes through the ordering, allowing each player to make her favorite decision on any single issue, until decisions are made on all the issues. Our rst relaxation in this direction, the round robin share (RRS), guarantees each player the utility that she would have received under the round robin mechanism if she were the last player in the ordering. Note that the round robin mechanism lets each player make decisions on roughly the same number of issues. A further relaxation in this direction, the pessimistic proportional share (PPS), guarantees each player the utility that she would get if her favorite alternatives were chosen for (approximately) a 1/n fraction of the issues, where these issues are chosen adversarially.
We examine the possibility and computational complexity of satisfying combinations of these fairness desiderata. We rst observe that the round robin mechanism satis es both Prop1 and RRS (and thus PPS). However, it fails to satisfy even the most basic e ciency property, Pareto optimality (PO), which requires that no other outcome should be able to make a player strictly be er o without making at least one player strictly worse o .
When insisting on Pareto optimality, we observe that the leximin mechanism -informally, it chooses the outcome that maximizes the minimum utility to any player -satis es RRS (therefore PPS) and PO via a simple argument. However, this argument does not extend to establishing Prop1, although we show that RRS implies a 1/2 approximation to Prop1. To that end, we prove that the maximum Nash welfare (MNW) solution -informally, it chooses the outcome that maximizes Table 1 . Axioms satisfied or approximated by the mechanisms we consider. The MNW solution is split into private goods and general decisions because we obtain significantly stronger results for private goods. Results for the leximin mechanism and the round robin method apply equally to private goods and public decisions. The approximation results are lower bounds; we omit the upper bounds from the table for simplicity.
the product of utilities to players -that is known for its many desirable fairness properties in dividing private goods [14] satis es Prop1 and PO in our public decision making framework, and simultaneously provides a 1/n approximation to both RRS and PPS. We also show that this approximation is tight up to a factor of O (log n). For division of private goods, these approximations improve signi cantly: the MNW solution completely satis es PPS, and provides an n/(2n − 1) > 1/2 approximation (but not be er than 2/3 approximation in the worst case) to RRS. Table 1 provides a summary of these results.
However, both the MNW outcome and the leximin outcome are N P-hard to compute. It is therefore natural to consider whether our fairness properties can be achieved in conjunction with PO in polynomial time. For public decision making, the answer turns out to be negative for PPS and RRS, assuming P N P. For division of private goods, however, we show that there exists a polynomial time algorithm that satis es PPS and PO.
Related Work
Two classic fair division mechanisms -the leximin mechanism and the maximum Nash welfare (MNW) solution -play an important role in this paper. Both mechanisms have been extensively studied in the literature on private goods division. In particular, Kurokawa et al. [23] (Section 3.2) show that the leximin mechanism satis es envy-freeness, proportionality, Pareto optimality, and a strong game-theoretic notion called group strategyproofness, which prevents even groups of players from manipulating the outcome to their bene t by misrepresenting their preferences, in a broad fair division domain with private goods and a speci c form of non-additive utilities. On the other hand, the MNW solution has been well studied in the realm of additive utilities [14, 31] . For divisible goods, the MNW solution coincides with another well-known solution concept called competitive equilibrium from equal incomes (CEEI) [34] , which also admits an approximate version for indivisible goods [11] . For indivisible goods, the MNW solution satis es envy-freeness up to one good, Pareto optimality, and approximations to other fairness guarantees. One line of research aims to approximate the optimum Nash welfare [16, 25] , although it is unclear if this achieves any of the appealing fairness guarantees of the MNW solution.
Our model is closely related to that of voting in combinatorial domains (see [24] for an overview). However, this literature focuses on the case where there is dependency between decisions on di erent issues. In contrast, our model remains interesting even though the issues are independent, and incorporating dependency is an interesting future direction. Although there is a range of work in the voting literature that focuses on fairness [2, 6, 15, 27] , especially in the context of representation in multi-winner elections, it focuses on ordinal, rather than cardinal, preferences. 1 1 Vincent Conitzer, Rupert Freeman, and Nisarg Shah Another di erence is that fairness concepts in voting apply most naturally when n >> m, whereas our notions of fairness are most interesting when m n.
Our work is also reminiscent of the participatory budgeting problem [12] , in which there are multiple public projects with di erent costs, and a set of projects need to be chosen based on preferences of the participants over the projects, subject to a budget constraint. Recently, researchers in computational social choice have addressed this problem from an axiomatic viewpoint [20] , including fairness considerations [17] , and from the viewpoint of implicit utilitarian voting [5] . However, they assume access only to ordinal preferences (that may stem from underlying cardinal utilities), while we assume a direct access to cardinal utilities, as is common in the fair division literature. Also, we do not have a budget constraint that binds the outcomes on di erent issues.
MODEL
For k ∈ N, de ne [k] {1, . . . , k }. Before we introduce the problem we study in this paper, let us review the standard fair division se ing with private goods.
Private goods division.
A private goods division problem consists of a set of players N = [n] and a set of m goods M. Each player i ∈ N is endowed with a utility function u i : M → R + such that u i ( ) denotes the value player i derives from good ∈ M. A standard assumption in the literature is that of additive valuations, i.e., (slightly abusing the notation) u i (S ) = ∈S u i ( ) for S ⊆ M. An allocation A is a partition of the set of goods among the set of players, where A i denotes the bundle of goods received by player i. Importantly, players only derive utility from the goods they receive, i.e., the goods private to them. e utility of player i under allocation A is u i (A) = u i (A i ).
Public decision making. A public decision making problem also has a set of players N = [n], but instead of private goods, it has a set of issues T = [m]. Each issue t ∈ T has an associated set of alternatives A t = {a t 1 , . . . , a t k t }, exactly one of which must be chosen. Each player i is endowed with a utility function u t i : A t → R + for each issue t, and derives utility u t i (a t j ) if alternative a t j is chosen for issue t. In contrast to private goods division, a single alternative can provide positive utility to multiple players.
An outcome c = (c 1 , . . . , c m ) of a public decision making problem is a choice of an alternative for every issue, i.e., it consists of an outcome c t ∈ A t for each issue t ∈ T . Let C denote the space of possible outcomes. Slightly abusing the notation, let u t i (c) = u t i (c t ) be the utility player i derives from the outcome of issue t. We also assume additive valuations: let u i (c) = t ∈T u t i (c) be the utility player i derives from outcome c.
In this work, we study deterministic outcomes, and in Section 5, discuss the implications when randomized outcomes are allowed. Further, we study the o ine problem in which we are presented with the entire problem up front, and need to choose the outcomes on all issues simultaneously. One can also de ne an online version of the problem [19] , in which we must commit to the outcome of issue t before observing issues t with t > t for all t, but we do not consider that version here.
Private goods versus public decisions. To see why public decision making generalizes private goods division, take an instance of private goods division, and create an instance of public decision making as follows. Create an issue t for each good . Let there be n alternatives in A t , where alternative a t i gives player i utility u i ( ) while giving zero utility to all other players. It is easy to see that choosing alternative a t i is equivalent to allocating good to player i. Hence, the constructed public decision making problem e ectively mimics the underlying private goods division problem. 
E iciency and Fairness
In this paper, we not only adapt classical notions of e ciency and fairness de ned for private goods division to our public decision making problem, but also introduce three fairness axioms that are novel for both public decision making and private goods division. First, we need additional notation that we will use throughout the paper. Let p m/n . For issue t ∈ T and player i ∈ N , let a t max (i) ∈ arg max a ∈A t {u t i (a)} and u t max (i) = u t i (a t max (i)). at is, a t max (i) is an alternative that gives player i the most utility for issue t, and u t max (i) is the utility player i derives from a t max (i). Let the sequence u (1) max (i), . . . , u (m) max (i) represent the maximum utilities player i can derive from di erent issues, sorted in a non-ascending order. Hence,
. E ciency. In this paper, we focus on a popular notion of economic e ciency. We say that an outcome c is Pareto optimal (PO) if there does not exist another outcome c that can provide at least as much utility as c to every player, i.e., u i (c ) u i (c) for all i ∈ N , and strictly more utility than c to some player, i.e., u i * (c ) > u i * (c) for some i * ∈ N . Fairness. For private goods division, perhaps the most prominent notion of fairness is envyfreeness [18] . An allocation A is called envy-free (EF) if every player values her bundle at least as much as she values any other player's bundle, i.e., u i (A i ) u i (A j ) for all i, j ∈ N . Because envyfreeness cannot in general be guaranteed, prior work also focuses on its relaxations. For instance, an allocation A is called envy-free up to one good (EF1) if no player envies another player a er removing at most one good from the la er player's bundle, i.e., for all i, j ∈ N , either
Unfortunately, as argued in Section 1, the notion of envy is not well de ned for public decisions. Hence, for public decision making, we focus on another fairness axiom, Proportionality, and its relaxations. For private goods division, proportionality is implied by envy-freeness. 2 Proportionality (Prop). At a high level, proportionality requires that each player must receive at least her "proportional share", which is a 1/n fraction of the utility she would derive if she could act as the dictator. For a public decision making problem, the proportional share of player i (Prop i ) is 1/n times the sum of the maximum utilities the player can derive across all issues, i.e.,
For α ∈ (0, 1], we say that an outcome c satis es α-proportionality (α-Prop) if u i (c) α · Prop i for all players i ∈ N . We refer to 1-Prop simply as Prop. Proportionality up to one issue (Prop1). We introduce a novel relaxation of proportionality (more generally, of α-proportionality) in the same spirit as envy-freeness up to one good, which is a relaxation of envy-freeness. For α ∈ (0, 1], we say that an outcome c satis es α-proportionality up to one issue (α-Prop1) if for every player i ∈ N , there exists an issue t ∈ T such that, ceteris paribus, changing the outcome of t from c t to a t max (i) ensures that player i achieves an α fraction of her proportional share, i.e., if
We refer to 1-Prop1 simply as Prop1.
Round robin share (RRS). Next, we introduce another novel fairness axiom that is motivated from the classic round robin method that, for private goods, lets players take turns and in each turn, pick a single most favorite item le unclaimed. For public decision making, we instead let players make a decision on a single issue in each turn. e utility guaranteed to the players by this approach is captured by the following fairness axiom.
Recall that the sequence u (1) max (i), . . . , u (m) max (i) represents the maximum utility player i can derive from di erent issues, sorted in a non-ascending order. en, we de ne the round robin share of player i (RRS i ) as
is is player i's utility from the round robin method, if she is last in the ordering and all issues she does not control give her utility 0. For α ∈ (0, 1], we say that an outcome c satis es α-round robin share (α-RRS) if u i (c) α · RRS i for all players i ∈ N . Again, we refer to 1-RRS simply as RRS. Pessimistic proportional share (PPS). We introduce another novel fairness axiom that is a further relaxation of round robin share. Note that the round robin method, by le ing players make a decision on a single issue per turn, allows each player to make decisions on at least p = m/n issues. e following axiom captures the utility players would be guaranteed if each player still made decisions on a "proportional share" of p issues, but if these issues were chosen pessimistically.
We de ne the pessimistic proportional share of player i (PPS i ) to be the sum of the maximum utilities the player can derive from a set of p issues, chosen adversarially to minimize this sum:
For α ∈ (0, 1], we say that an outcome c satis es α-pessimistic proportional share (α-PPS) if u i (c) α · PPS i for all players i ∈ N . Again, we refer to 1-PPS simply as PPS.
Connections among fairness properties. Trivially, proportionality (Prop) implies proportionality up to one issue (Prop1). In addition, it can also be checked that the following sequence of logical implications holds:
Here, MMS is the maximin share guarantee [11, 30] . Adapting the de nition naturally from private goods division to public decision making, the maximin share of a player is the utility the player can guarantee herself by dividing the set of issues into n bundles, if she gets to make the decisions best for her on the issues in an adversarially chosen bundle. e maximin share (MMS) guarantee requires that each player must receive utility that is at least her maximin share. We do not focus on the maximin share guarantee in this paper.
Mechanisms
A mechanism for a public decision making problem (resp. a private goods division problem) maps each input instance of the problem to an outcome (resp. an allocation). We say that a mechanism satis es a fairness or e ciency property if it always returns an outcome satisfying the property.
ere are three prominent mechanisms that play a key role in this paper. Round robin method. As mentioned earlier, the round robin method rst xes an ordering of the players. en the players take turns choosing their most preferred alternative on a single issue of their choice whose outcome has not yet been determined. e leximin mechanism. e leximin mechanism chooses an outcome which maximizes the utility of the worst o player, i.e., min i ∈N u i (c). Subject to this constraint, it maximizes the utility of the second least well o player, and so on. Note that the leximin mechanism is trivially Pareto optimal because if it were possible to improve some player's utility without reducing that of any other, it would improve the objective that the leximin mechanism optimizes. Maximum Nash welfare (MNW). e Nash welfare of an outcome c is the product of utilities to all players under c: NW (c) = i ∈N u i (c). When there exists an outcome c with NW (c) > 0, then the MNW solution chooses an arbitrary outcome c that maximizes the Nash welfare. When all outcomes have zero Nash welfare, it nds a largest cardinality set S of players that can be given non-zero utility, and selects an outcome maximizing the product of their utilities, i.e., i ∈S u i (c).
Examples
We illustrate the fairness properties through two examples. In this case, we have Prop 1 = RRS 1 = PPS 1 = 4, whereas Prop 2 = RRS 2 = 2 and PPS 2 = 0. Consider outcome c = (a 1 1 , a 2 1 , a 3 1 , a 4 1 , a 5 1 , a 6 1 , a 7 1 , a 8 1 ). en, we have u 1 (c) = 8 while u 2 (c) = 0, which satis es PPS but violates RRS. Further, c also violates Prop1 because switching the outcome of any single issue can only give player 2 utility at most 1, which is less than Prop 2 = 2. On the other hand, outcome c = (a 1 2 , a 2 2 , a 3 2 , a 4 2 , a 5 1 , a 6 1 , a 7 1 , a 8 1 ) achieves u 1 (c) = u 2 (c) = 4, and satis es Prop (and thus its relaxations Prop1, RRS, and PPS).
(APPROXIMATE) SATISFIABILITY OF AXIOMS
If we are willing to sacri ce Pareto optimality, then we can easily achieve both RRS (and therefore PPS) and Prop1 simultaneously with the round robin mechanism. is is not a surprising result. RRS is de ned based on the guarantee provided by the round robin mechanism, and PPS is a relaxation of RRS. e round robin mechanism is also known to satisfy EF1 for private goods division, which is similar in spirit to Prop1. T 3.1. e round robin mechanism satis es RRS (and therefore PPS) and Prop1, and runs in polynomial time.
P
. e round robin mechanism clearly runs in polynomial time (note that it is easy for a player to choose the next issue on which to determine the outcome). To see why it satis es RRS, note that the mechanism allows every player to make a decision on one issue once every n turns.
us, for each k ∈ [p], every player gets to make decisions on at least k of her "top" k · n issues, when issues are sorted in the descending order of the utility her favorite alternative in the issue gives her. It is easy to see that this implies every player i gets utility at least RRS i . Because RRS implies PPS, the mechanism also satis es PPS. It remains to show that it satis es Prop1 as well. Fix a player i and let c be the outcome produced by the round robin mechanism for some choosing order of the players. Because the round robin mechanism satis es RRS, player i gets utility at least
For k ∈ [m], let the k th favorite issue of player i be the issue t for which u t max (i) is the k th highest. Let ∈ N ∪ {0} be the largest index such that for every k ∈ [ ], outcome c chooses player i's most preferred alternative on her k th favorite issue. Let t * be her ( + 1) th favorite issue. To show that c satis es Prop1, we construct outcome c from c by only changing the outcome of issue t * to a t * max (i), and show that u i (c ) Prop i . Note that if p, then
Let < p. en, using the fact that the round robin mechanism lets player i choose her most preferred alternative for at least k of her favorite k · n issues for every k p (and her ( + 1) th favorite issue was not one of these), we have
erefore, the round robin mechanism satis es Prop1.
While this result seems to re ect favorably upon the round robin mechanism, recall that it violates Pareto optimality even for private goods division. For public decision making, a simple reason for this is that the round robin mechanism, for each issue, chooses an alternative that is some player's favorite, while it could be unanimously be er to choose compromise solutions that make many players happy. Imagine there are two players and two issues, each with two alternatives. e "extreme" alternative in each issue i ∈ {1, 2} gives utility 1 to player i but 0 to the other, while the "compromise" alternative in each issue i ∈ {1, 2} gives utility 2/3 to both players. It is clear that both players prefer choosing the compromise alternative in both issues to choosing the extreme alternative in both issues. Because such "Pareto improvements" which make some players happier without making any player worse o are unanimously preferred by the players, the round robin outcome becomes highly undesirable. We therefore seek mechanisms that provide fairness guarantees while satisfying Pareto optimality.
A natural question is whether there exists a mechanism that satis es RRS, Prop1, and PO. An obvious approach is to start from an outcome that already satis es RRS and Prop1 (e.g., the round robin outcome), and make Pareto improvements until no such improvements are possible. While Pareto improvements preserve RRS as the utilities to the players do not decrease, Prop1 can be lost as it depends on the exact alternatives chosen and not only on the utilities to the players. We leave it as an important open question to determine if RRS, Prop1, and PO can be satis ed simultaneously.
We therefore consider satisfying each fairness guarantee individually with PO. One can easily nd an outcome satisfying RRS and PO by following the aforementioned approach of starting with an outcome satisfying RRS, and making Pareto improvements while possible. ere is also a more direct approach to satisfying RRS and PO. Recall that the leximin mechanism chooses the outcome which maximizes the minimum utility to any player, subject to that maximizes the second minimum utility, and so on. It is easy to see that this mechanism is always Pareto optimal. Now, let us normalize the utilities of all players such that RRS i = 1 for every player i ∈ N . 3 Because the round robin mechanism gives every player i utility at least RRS i = 1, it must be the case that the leximin mechanism operating on these normalized utilities must also give every player utility at least 1, and thus produce an outcome that is both RRS and PO. T 3.2. e leximin mechanism satis es RRS, PO, and (1/2)-Prop1.
at leximin satis es (1/2)-Prop1 follows directly from the following lemma, and noting that leximin satis es RRS.
. Summing the two equations, we get
RRS i for some outcome c. en either i already receives her most valued item, in which case she receives utility at least max{RRS i , u (1) max (i)} 1 2 Prop i , or she does not receive her most valued item. If she does not, then a er giving it to her, she receives utility at least 1 2 Prop i . erefore, c satis es (1/2)-Prop1.
Next, we study whether we can achieve Prop1 and PO simultaneously. Neither of the previous approaches seems to work: we already argued that following Pareto improvements could lose Prop1, and the normalization trick is di cult to apply because Prop1 is not de ned in terms of any xed share of utility. One starting point to achieving Prop1 and PO is the maximum Nash welfare (MNW) solution, which, for private goods division, is known to satisfy the similar guarantee of EF1 and PO [14] . It turns out that the MNW solution is precisely what we need. Before we prove this, we need a folklore result, which essentially states that if the sum of n terms is to be reduced by a xed quantity δ that is less than each term, then their product reduces the most when δ is taken out of the lowest term. e following lemma proves this result when all initial terms are 1, which is su cient for our purpose. e proof of the lemma appears in the full version of the paper. 4 L 3.5. Let {x 1 , . . . , x n } be a set of n non-negative real numbers such that
Fix an instance of the public decision making problem. Let S ⊆ N be the set of players that the MNW outcome c gives positive utility to. en, by the de nition of the MNW outcome, S must be a largest set of players that can simultaneously be given positive utility, and c must maximize the product of utilities of players in S.
First, we show that c is PO. Note that a Pareto improvement over c must either give a positive utility to a player in N \ S or give more utility to a player in S, without reducing the utility to any player in S. is is a contradiction because it violates either optimality of the size of S or optimality of the product of utilities of players in S. Hence, MNW satis es PO.
We now show that MNW also satis es Prop1. Suppose for contradiction that Prop1 is violated for player i under c. First, note that we must have Prop i > 0. Further, it must be the case that u t max (i) > 0 for at least n + 1 issues. Were this not the case, Prop1 would be trivially satis ed for player i since we can give her utility
by changing the outcome on a single issue. We now show that u i (c) > 0 (i.e., i ∈ S). For contradiction, suppose otherwise. For each of the (at least) n + 1 issues with u t max (i) > 0, there must exist another player j i that gets positive utility only from that issue under c (otherwise we could use that issue to give positive utility to i while not reducing any other agents' utility to zero, contradicting the maximality of S). But this is impossible, since there are at least n + 1 issues and only n − 1 agents (other than i).
Because MNW outcomes and the Prop1 property are invariant to individual scaling of utilities, let us scale the utilities such that Prop i = 1 and u j (c) = 1 for all j ∈ S \ {i}. Select issue t * ∈ T as
.
Note that t * is well de ned because u t max (i) > u t i (c) for at least one t ∈ T , otherwise Prop1 would not be violated for player i.
We now show that outcome c such that c t * = a t * max (i) and c t = c t for all t ∈ T \ {t * } achieves strictly greater product of utilities of players in S than outcome c does, which is a contradiction as c is an MNW outcome. First, note that
where the penultimate transition follows because we normalized utilities to achieve u j (c) = 1 for every j ∈ S \ {i}, every j ∈ N \ S satis es u j (c) = 0, and player i does not receive her proportional share. e nal transition holds due to our normalization Prop i = 1. Let δ = j ∈S \{i } u t * j (c). en, Equation (1) 
where the last inequality follows because the original outcome c violated Prop1 for player i. In particular, this implies δ < 1. Our goal is to show that j ∈S u j (c ) > u i (c) = j ∈S u j (c), where the last equality holds due to our normalization u j (c) = 1 for j ∈ S \ {i} and because i ∈ S. is would be a contradiction because c maximizes the product of utilities of players in S. Now,
where the rst transition follows from se ing 1 = u j (c) (by our normalization) and noting that c and c are identical for all issues except t * , and the second because all utilities are non-negative. Hence, Lemma 3.5 implies that j ∈S \{i } u j (c ) 1 − δ . us,
where the inequality holds because u i (c) + δ < 1 from Equation (2) [14] already show that MNW satis es PO. In addition, they also show that MNW satis es EF1, which implies Prop1 due to our next result. To be consistent with the goods division literature, we use proportionality up to one good (rather than one issue) in the private goods division context. L 3.6. For private goods division, envy-freeness up to one good (EF1) implies proportionality up to one good (Prop1).
. Take an instance of private goods division with a set of players N and a set of goods M. Let A be an allocation satisfying EF1. Fix a player i ∈ N .
Due to the de nition of EF1, there must exist 5 a set of goods
Note that X has less than n goods. Suppose player i receives good * ∈ arg max ∈X u i ( ). Note that * A i . en, we have u i (A i ∪ { * }) u i (M )/n = Prop i , which implies that Prop1 is satis ed with respect to player i. Because player i was chosen arbitrarily, we have that EF1 implies Prop1. Equation 3 in the proof of Lemma 3.6 directly implies the following lemma because the set X in the equation contains at most n − 1 goods. L 3.7. Let A be an allocation of private goods that satis es EF1. en, for every player i,
where u (t ) max (i) is the utility player i derives from her t th most valued good.
Next, we turn our a ention to RRS and PPS. While MNW does not satisfy either of them, it approximates both. T 3.8. e MNW solution satis es 1/n-RRS (and therefore 1/n-PPS). e approximation is tight for both RRS and PPS up to a factor of O (log n).
. We rst show the lower bound. Fix an instance of public decision making, and let c denote an MNW outcome. Let S ⊆ N denote the set of players that achieve positive utility under c.
Without loss of generality, let us normalize the utilities such that u j (c) = 1 for every j ∈ S. Suppose for contradiction that for some player i, u i (c) < (1/n) · RRS i . First, this implies that RRS i > 0, which in turn implies that player i must be able to derive a positive utility from at least n di erent issues. By an argument identical to that used to argue that u i (c) > 0 in the proof of eorem 3.4, it can be shown that we must also have u i (c) > 0 in this case (i.e., i ∈ S). Now, recall that the sequence u (1) max (i), . . . , u (m) max (i) contains the maximum utility player i can derive from di erent issues, sorted in a non-ascending order. For every q ∈ [p], let
at is, we divide the public decision making into sets of n issues, grouped by player i's maximum utility for them, and for each set of issues, we let t q be the one that the remaining players derive the lowest total utility from. Note that tn for each q ∈ [p], and therefore u
We will show that outcome c , where c t q = a t q max (i) for all q ∈ [p] and c t = c t for all other issues t, achieves a higher product of utilities to players in S than c does, which is a contradiction because c is an MNW outcome. First, note that
Further, we have
where the rst equality follows from our normalization, the second because c and c only di er on issues {t q } q ∈[p] , and the last because all utilities are non-negative.
Reversing the order of the summation and further manipulating the expression, we have
where the rst transition follows from the de nition of t q . By Lemma 3.5, we have
where the inequality holds because u i (c ) RRS i > n · u i (c) = n, as player i receives her round robin share under c but did not even receive a 1/n fraction of it under c. Hence, outcome c achieves a higher product of utilities to players in S than c does, which is a contradiction. Due to space considerations, the proof of the upper bound appears in the full version.
For private goods, we can show that the MNW solution provides much be er approximations to both RRS and PPS, as a result of its strong fairness guarantee of EF1. L 3.9. For private goods division, envy-freeness up to one good (EF1) implies PPS and n/(2n−1)-RRS, but does not imply n/(2n − 2)-RRS.
. Let A be an allocation of private goods that satis es EF1. First, we show that A must also satisfy PPS. Suppose for contradiction that it violates PPS. en, there exists a player i such that u i (A i ) < PPS i , which in turn implies that |A i | < p. Because the average number of goods per player is m n p, there must exist a player j such that |A j | > p. Hence, for any good ∈ A j , player j has at least p goods even a er removing from A j , which implies u i (A j \{ }) PPS i > u i (A i ). However, this contradicts the fact that A is EF1.
We now show that A also satis es 1/2-RRS. By Lemma 3.7, we have 
To see this, suppose for contradiction that u i (A i ) < u (n) max (i), which implies that player i is not allocated any of her n most valued goods. erefore, by the pigeonhole principle, there must exist a player j ∈ N \ {i} that is allocated at least two of these goods. Hence, for any ∈ A j , we have
, which violates EF1. Finally, adding n times Equation (4) with n − 1 times Equation (5), we obtain
which implies the desired n/(2n − 1)-RRS guarantee. For the upper bound, consider an instance with n players and n 2 goods, and de ne player 1's utility function to be
Note that RRS 1 = 1 + (n − 1) 1 n−1 = 2. Consider the allocation A with A 1 = { n+1 , . . . , 2n },
. . , i ·n } for all players i > 2. Let the utilities of players 2 through n be positive for the goods they receive and zero for the remaining goods. Hence, they clearly do not envy any players. For player 1, we have u 1 (A 1 ) = n n−1 , u 1 (A 2 \ { 2 }) = 1, and u 1 (A i \ { i }) = n n−1 for all i > 2. at is, player 1 does not envy any other player up to one good. Hence, A satis es EF1, and player 1 obtains a n 2n−2 fraction of her RRS share, as required.
As a corollary of Lemma 3.9, EF1 implies 1/2-RRS, and this approximation is asymptotically tight. Further, because the MNW solution satis es EF1, Lemma 3.9 immediately provides guarantees (lower bounds) for the MNW solution. However, the upper bound in the proof of Lemma 3.9 does not work for the MNW solution. Next, we establish a much weaker lower bound, leaving open the possibility that the MNW solution may achieve a constant approximation be er than 1/2 to RRS. T 3.10. For private goods division, the MNW solution satis es PPS and n/(2n − 1)-RRS. For every ε > 0, the MNW solution does not satisfy (2/3 + ε )-RRS.
. e lower bounds follow directly from Lemma 3.9 and the fact that the MNW solution satis es EF1. For the upper bound, consider an instance with two players and four goods. Player 1 has utilities (1 − δ, 1 − δ, 1/2, 1/2) and player 2 has utilities (1, 1, 0, 0) for goods ( 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 ), respectively. Note that RRS 1 = 3/2 − δ . e MNW allocation A is given by
. e upper bound follows by se ing δ su ciently small.
COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY
In Section 3, we showed that without requiring Pareto optimality, we can achieve both RRS (thus PPS) and Prop1 in polynomial time using the round robin method ( eorem 3.1). In contrast, when we require PO, the leximin mechanism (with an appropriate normalization of utilities) provides RRS (thus PPS) and PO, while the MNW solution provides Prop1 and PO. However, both these solutions are N P-hard to compute [4, 31] . is raises a natural question whether we can e ciently nd outcomes satisfying our fairness guarantees along with PO. For PPS, the answer is negative. Note that it is the search problem of nding an outcome (any outcome) satisfying PPS and PO for which we prove computational hardness; the decision problem of testing the existence of such an outcome is trivial as we know it always exists. Before we prove this result, we need to introduce a new (to our knowledge) decision problem and show that it is N P-complete.
Exact Triple-Cover by 3-sets (X33C):. An instance (Y , T ) of X33C is given by a set Y of r vertices and a set T = {T 1 ,T 2 , . . . ,T m }, where each T i is a set of three vertices. e decision problem is to determine whether it is possible to choose r sets, with repetition allowed, such that every vertex is contained in exactly three of the chosen sets (an exact triple-cover).
Let us contrast this with the de nition of the popular NP-complete problem, Exact Cover by 3-sets (X3C): An instance (X , S) of X3C is given by a set X of 3q vertices and a set S = {S 1 , . . . , S n }, where each S i is a set of three vertices. e decision problem is to determine if there exists a subset of S of size q that covers every vertex x ∈ X exactly once (an exact cover).
e proof of Lemma 4.2 proceeds via a reduction from X3C, and is presented in the full version. Using this lemma, we can now show that nding an outcome satisfying PPS and PO is N P-hard through a reduction from X33C.
be an instance of X33C, with |Y | = r . Let ε ∈ (0, 1/(3r )). We de ne a public decision making problem as follows. ere are r players, one corresponding to each vertex ∈ Y , and r issues. For each issue, there are |Y | + |T | alternatives. For each issue t and each player i, there is an alternative a t,i which is valued at 1 − ε by player i, and 0 by all other players. e remaining |T | alternatives correspond to the 3-sets from the X33C instance. For a set T j ∈ T , the corresponding alternative is valued at 1 3 by players i ∈ T j , and valued at 0 by all other players. Note that PPS i = 1 − ε for each player i, because there are exactly as many issues as players, and each player values its most preferred alternative for each issue at 1 − ε.
We now show that there exists an exact triple-cover by 3-sets if and only if all outcomes to the public decision making problem that satisfy PPS and PO have u i (c) = 1 for all i. First, suppose that there exists an exact triple-cover by 3-sets. We need to show that all outcomes satisfying PPS and PO have u i (c) = 1 for all i. So suppose otherwise -that there exists an outcome satisfying PPS and PO with u i (c) 1 for some player i. In particular, some player must have u i (c) > 1, otherwise c is not PO (because it is possible to choose an outcome corresponding exactly to an exact triple-cover, which gives each player utility 1). But players only derive utility in discrete amounts of 1 − ε or 1 3 , which means that any player with u i (c) > 1 has u i (c) 4 3 − ε. Since c satis es PPS, the social welfare must satisfy
where the last inequality holds because ε < 1/(3r ). However, this is a contradiction because each alternative in each of the r issues contributes at most 1 to the social welfare. erefore, every outcome satisfying PPS and PO has u i (c) = 1 for all i.
Next, suppose that there does not exist an exact triple-cover by 3-sets. So if we choose an alternative corresponding to a 3-set for every issue, it is not possible for every player to derive utility 1. erefore, some player must derive utility 2 3 (or lower), which violates PPS. us, every outcome that satis es PPS must include at least one issue where the chosen alternative is one that corresponds to a player, not to a 3-set. Such an alternative only contributes 1 − ε to social welfare. erefore, the social welfare is strictly less than r , which means that some player gets utility strictly less than 1. erefore, there is no outcome satisfying PPS (either with or without PO) such that u i (c) = 1 for all i. Since the set of outcomes satisfying PPS is always non-empty, it is therefore not the case that all outcomes satisfying PPS and PO have u i (c) = 1 for all i.
Because every outcome satisfying RRS also satis es PPS, we have the following corollary. For private goods division, we show, in stark contrast to eorem 4.1, that we can nd an allocation satisfying PPS and PO in polynomial time. is is achieved using Algorithm 1. Interestingly, it produces not an arbitrary allocation satisfying PPS and PO, but an allocation that assigns at least p = m/n goods to every player -implying PPS, and maximizes weighted (utilitarian) social welfare according to some weight vector -implying PO. At a high level, the algorithm works as follows. It begins with an arbitrary weight vector w, and an allocation A maximizing the corresponding weighted (utilitarian) social welfare. en, it executes a loop (Lines 3-22) while there exists a player receiving less than p goods, and each iteration of the loop alters the allocation in a way that one of the players who received more than p goods loses a good, one of the players who received less than p goods gains a good, and every other player retains the same number of goods as before.
Each iteration of the loop maintains a set DEC of players whose weight it reduces. Initially, DEC consists of players who have more than p goods (Line 7). When the weights are reduced enough so that a player in DEC is about to lose a good to a player, necessarily outside DEC (Lines 9-11), the la er player is added to DEC (Line 12) before proceeding further. When a player who has less than p goods is added to DEC, this process stops and the algorithm leverages the set of ties it created along the way to make the aforementioned alteration to the allocation (Lines [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] .
We now formally state that this produces an allocation satisfying PPS and PO, and that it runs in polynomial time; the proof appears in the full version. We note that the convenient approach of weighted welfare maximization we use in eorem 4.4 cannot be used for nding an outcome satisfying RRS and PO, as the following example shows.
is leads us to conjecture that it may be N P-hard to nd such an outcome.
Example 4.5. Consider a private goods division problem with two players and four goods. Player 1 has utilities (4, 4, 1, 1) and player 2 has utilities (3, 3, 2, 2) for goods ( 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 ), respectively. Note that RRS 1 = RRS 2 = 5. Consider assigning weights w 1 and w 2 to players 1 and 2, respectively. If 4w 1 > 3w 2 , i.e., w 1 > 3w 2 /4 then player 1 receives both 1 and 2 , which means that player 2 receives utility less than her RRS share. On the other hand, if 3w 2 > 4w 1 , i.e., w 1 < 3w 2 /4 then player 2 receives both 1 and 2 , which means that player 1 receives utility less than her RRS share. e only remaining possibility is that w 1 = 3w 2 /4, but in that case, player 2 receives both 3 and 4 . Regardless of how we divide goods 1 and 2 , one of the two players still receives utility less than her RRS share.
In contrast, a simple modi cation of Algorithm 1 seems to quickly nd an allocation satisfying Prop1 and PO in hundreds of thousands of randomized simulations. At each iteration of this version, the set DEC initially consists of players who a ain their proportional share (it is easy to show using the Pigeonhole principle that this set is non-empty for any weighted welfare maximizing allocation), and ends when a player is added to DEC that is not currently achieving Prop1. us, at every loop, a player that was receiving her proportional share may lose a good (but will still achieve at least Prop1), the player added to DEC that was not achieving Prop1 gains a good, and some players that were achieving Prop1 but not their proportional share may lose a good, but only if they gain one too. ese three classes of players are therefore analogous to players with more than p goods, less than p goods, and exactly p goods in Algorithm 1. Unfortunately, we are unable to prove termination of this algorithm because it is possible that a player who achieves Prop1 but not her proportional share loses a high-valued good while gaining a low-valued good, thus potentially sacri cing Prop1. us we do not get a property parallel to the key property of Algorithm 1, that no player's utility ever drops below her PPS share, a er she a ains it. However, our algorithm always seems to terminate quickly and nds an allocation satisfying Prop1 and PO in our randomized simulations, which leads us to conjecture that it may be possible to nd an allocation satisfying Prop1 and PO in polynomial time, either from our algorithm directly or via some other utilization of weighted welfare maximization.
DISCUSSION
We introduced several novel fairness notions for public decision making and considered their relationships to existing mechanisms and fairness notions. roughout the paper, we highlighted various open questions including the existence (and complexity) of a mechanism satisfying RRS, Prop1, and PO, the complexity of nding an outcome satisfying Prop1 and PO (for public decisions and private goods), the complexity of nding an outcome satisfying RRS and PO (for private goods), and whether MNW provides a constant approximation to RRS be er than 1/2.
So far we only considered deterministic outcomes. If randomized outcomes are allowed (an alternative interpretation in the private goods case is that the goods are in nitely divisible), then the MNW solution satis es Prop as a direct consequence of it satisfying Prop1 for deterministic outcomes ( eorem 3.4). 6 To see this, consider replicating each issue K times and dividing utilities by K. e relative e ect of granting a single player control of a single issue becomes negligible.
us, as K approaches in nity, the utility of each player i in an MNW outcome approaches a value that is at least their proportional share Prop i . e fraction of copies of issue t in which outcome a t j is selected can be interpreted as the weight placed on a t j in the randomized outcome. Because RRS, PPS, and Prop1 are relaxations of Prop, the randomized MNW outcome also satis es all of them.
For private goods division, this can be seen as a corollary of the fact that the randomized MNW outcome satis es envy-freeness, which is strictly stronger than proportionality. is hints at a very interesting question: Is there a stronger fairness notion than proportionality in the public decision making framework that generalizes envy-freeness in private goods division? Although such a notion would not be satis able by deterministic mechanisms, it may be satis ed by randomized mechanisms, or it could have novel relaxations that may be of independent interest.
At a high level, our work provides a framework bringing together two long-studied branches of social choice theory -fair division theory and voting theory. Both have at their heart the aim to aggregate individual preferences into a collective outcome that is fair and agreeable, but approach the problem in di erent ways. Fair division theory typically deals with multiple private goods, assumes access to cardinal utilities, and focuses on notions of fairness such as envy-freeness and proportionality. Voting theory, in contrast, typically deals with a single public decision (with the exception of combinatorial voting mentioned earlier), assumes access only to less expressive ordinal preferences, has the "one voter, one vote" fairness built inherently into the voting rules, and focuses on di erent axiomatic desiderata such as Condorcet consistency and monotonicity.
Of course, one can use a voting approach to fair division, since we can have players express preferences over complete outcomes, and this approach has been used successfully to import mechanisms from voting to fair division and vice versa [1, 3] . However, not only does this approach result in an exponential blowup in the number of alternatives, it also does not provide a convenient way to express fair-division-like axioms. Continuing to explore connections between the two elds remains a compelling direction for future work.
